By Olusegun B. Abejide
The core issue between Nigeria and Burkina Faso is a diplomatic crisis triggered by the emergency landing of a Nigerian Air Force C-130 carrying 11 military personnel in Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso, on December 8, 2025. While Nigeria claims it was a technical emergency during a routine ferry to Portugal, the incident has escalated into a dispute with broader implications for West African politics.
As of December 12, these Nigerian soldiers remain detained in Burkina Faso, despite earlier conflicting reports suggesting they had been released. Foreign Affairs Minister Yusuf Tuggar confirmed their continued detention while speaking at the ECOWAS Commission headquarters in Abuja, noting that diplomatic channels remain open and active. The timing of this incident, coming just one day after Nigerian airstrikes helped foil a coup attempt in the Benin Republic, has created layers of suspicion and tension that go far beyond a simple airspace violation.
Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s government and the Alliance of Sahel States (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) call the landing an “unfriendly act” and airspace violation. They warn that unauthorized aircraft could be “neutralized.” This stance reflects the deep fractures in West African politics since these nations left ECOWAS and chose military
The heart of this crisis is not whether Nigeria can respond forcefully—its capability is well known. Instead, the central challenge is whether using military force actually serves Nigeria’s interests and matches the democratic values President Tinubu is expected to uphold. This distinction is crucial for shaping policy.
This is about much more than 11 detained soldiers or one aircraft. It’s about competing visions for West Africa, sovereignty and regional order, colonial legacy, and the difference between democracy in practice versus rhetoric.
Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who seized power in a September 2022 coup at age 36, casts himself as a pan-Africanist revolutionary in the mold of Burkina Faso’s iconic leader, Thomas Sankara. His popularity has surged across Africa, especially among youth who see him as willing to challenge Western dominance and prioritize African sovereignty. He expelled French troops, nationalized mines, strengthened Russian ties, and rejected what he perceives as neo-colonial interference from former colonial powers.
Traoré’s popularity means any Nigerian aggression will be framed as democracy versus sovereignty, ECOWAS versus African self-determination, and, for Nigeria, as complicity with Western interests versus African liberation. This perception could isolate Nigeria and undermine its leadership in West Africa.
The Alliance of Sahel States was formed because these three countries saw ECOWAS as too aligned with French and Western interests. Viewed sanctions and military threats as illegitimate interference. They seek an African governance model free from foreign control, though it currently lacks democratic legitimacy.
Some Nigerians, frustrated, call for tough action. Former Senator Ayodele Arise advocated military options, insisting Nigeria must show strength. While understandable, this approach misunderstands the situation and Nigeria’s interests.
Diplomacy here is not about weakness or appeasement. It’s about achieving Nigeria’s objectives: bringing our soldiers home safely and sustaining regional stability—not proving military prowess, no one doubts. Literary response may feel satisfying, but it would create more problems than it solves.
Consider the practical realities. Nigeria’s military is already stretched thin dealing with insurgencies in the northeast, banditry in the northwest, separatist movements in the southeast, and various security challenges across the country. Does it make strategic sense to open a new front with three countries that have recently aligned their defense policies and brought in Russian military support? And for what gain? To rescue soldiers who could be released through diplomatic pressure without a single shot being fired?
More importantly, think about the regional implications. If Nigeria uses military force against Burkina Faso, it will validate every claim Traoré and his allies have made about ECOWAS being a tool of Western interference. It will push these three countries even closer to Russia and China. It will damage Nigeria’s relationships with other African nations, which are watching closely. And it will make it exponentially harder for Nigeria to play any constructive role in eventually helping these countries transition back to democratic governance.
This crisis is a test of what democratic leadership looks like in practice. President Tinubu must show that Nigeria’s interests are best served by restraint and strategic patience, not by military escalation. Demonstrating this approach is essential to Nigeria’s leadership role and reinforces the core argument for diplomacy over force.
One of the most delicate aspects of this situation concerns perceptions of French influence on Nigerian policy. President Tinubu has sustained friendly ties with France, which is legitimate for Nigeria as a sovereign nation. However, in the current West African context, this relationship has become politically toxic, a reality Nigerian policymakers must acknowledge and address.
France’s colonial past in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger left scars. The CFA franc, only recently abandoned, was seen as a form of French economic control. The military aid was perceived as self-serving. Whether these perceptions are fully fair matters less than their prevalence in francophone West Africa.
If Nigeria uses force, especially with French help, Traoré’s accusations will be confirmed. Nigeria will be seen as enforcing neo-colonial interests—an image that will haunt its foreign policy for decades.
Nigeria shouldn’t make decisions based solely on perceptions, but Tinubu’s government must recognize and address these dynamics. Using African diplomatic channels, such as ECOWAS and the AU—without French involvement—advances Nigeria’s interests while sidestepping perception traps.
Nigeria’s issue is with Traoré’s military regime, not the Burkinabé people. Burkinabés are West African neighbors with deep ties to Nigeria via culture, economy, and family. Sustaining these bonds is crucial.
The Burkinabé people are currently living under military rule, not because they rejected democracy, but because their democratic institutions failed them in the face of a growing security crisis. Jihadist violence had spiraled out of control under civilian leadership, creating the opening that military officers exploited. The fact that Traoré remains popular despite increasing authoritarianism reflects how desperate the situation had become, not necessarily a wholesale rejection of democratic principles.
If Nigeria frames this conflict as a national rivalry rather than as a contest between democratic principles and military rule, we risk alienating Burkinabés who might otherwise support a return to civilian governance. We need their support to restore democracy in the Sahel. Military action would likely rally them to their government out of nationalism, regardless of their views on Traoré’s policies.
This is why Nigeria’s diplomatic messaging needs to be carefully calibrated. We should express concern about the detention of our soldiers while simultaneously reaffirming respect for Burkinabé sovereignty and our commitment to the Burkinabé people’s well-being. We should frame this as a misunderstanding that can be resolved between neighbors, not as a crisis that threatens war. We should continue to emphasize the brotherhood of West African peoples while maintaining that military governance is inconsistent with the region’s democratic aspirations.
The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS represents the most serious crisis in the bloc’s history. ECOWAS was founded on principles of regional integration, collective security, and democratic governance. The departure of these three nations and their formation of the rival Alliance of Sahel States challenge ECOWAS’s relevance and effectiveness.
However, this crisis also presents an opportunity for ECOWAS to reconsider its approach. The bloc’s response to the coups in these countries, including sanctions and threats of military intervention, may have been principled but was clearly counterproductive. Rather than preserving democratic norms, these measures pushed the military governments together and into the arms of external powers while inflicting suffering on ordinary citizens already dealing with security crises.
Nigeria, as ECOWAS’s leading member, should use this moment to advocate for a more nuanced approach to democracy promotion in West Africa. Yes, military coups should be condemned and constitutional order defended. But ECOWAS also needs strategies for engaging with military governments constructively, creating pathways back to civilian rule that these governments might actually take rather than just isolating them further.
The current detention crisis could become a turning point if handled correctly. A successful diplomatic resolution could demonstrate that dialogue between ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States remains possible despite political differences. It could create momentum for broader discussions about regional security cooperation, which all parties desperately need given the continuing jihadist threat. It could even lay the groundwork for eventual reconciliation and renewed regional integration.
But these possibilities evaporate the moment military force enters the equation. A military confrontation would cement the division of West Africa into opposing camps, likely for a generation. It would make ECOWAS’s task of promoting democratic governance vastly more difficult. And it would give external powers, whether France, Russia, or China, even more influence over West African affairs as countries seek protection from regional conflict.
President Tinubu and his administration should pursue a multi-track diplomatic strategy to resolve this crisis and position Nigeria for long-term success in West Africa.
First, the immediate priority must be securing the safe return of the detained Nigerian soldiers. Minister Tuggar has correctly emphasized that diplomatic talks are ongoing. These should continue with patience and persistence. Nigeria should engage Burkina Faso not just bilaterally but also through mediators, including other African countries that maintain good relations with both Nigeria and Burkina Faso. The African Union could play a helpful role here as a neutral convener.
Second, Nigeria needs a broader communication strategy that addresses regional perceptions. President Tinubu should give a major speech on Nigeria’s vision for West Africa that emphasizes African unity, mutual respect among neighbors, and the connection between democracy and prosperity. This speech should acknowledge the legitimate grievances driving political instability in the Sahel while reaffirming democratic principles as the best path forward.
Third, Nigeria should work within ECOWAS to develop new frameworks for engaging with governments that don’t meet democratic standards. This might include graduated responses that maintain pressure for democratic reform while avoiding blanket isolation, which can be counterproductive. ECOWAS needs to become more than just an enforcer of democratic norms; it needs to become a facilitator of democratic transitions.
Fourth, Nigeria must demonstrate through its own governance that democracy delivers results. The best argument for democratic governance is not lectures or threats but practical demonstration that democratic systems can provide security, economic opportunity, and dignified governance. If Nigeria can make progress on its own security challenges while maintaining democratic institutions, that success will speak louder than any number of diplomatic interventions.
Finally, Nigeria needs to cultivate relationships with civil society, opposition movements, and democratic activists throughout West Africa, including in countries currently under military rule. These relationships will be crucial when opportunities for democratic transition eventually emerge. Nigeria’s true friends in Burkina Faso are not the military junta but the journalists, activists, and political leaders who continue advocating for civilian rule despite considerable personal risk.
The detention of 11 Nigerian soldiers in Burkina Faso is certainly a serious matter that demands the Nigerian government’s attention. But it’s not a crisis that justifies military escalation. The soldiers’ lives are not currently in danger according to all available information. Diplomatic channels remain open. And the strategic costs of military action would vastly outweigh any conceivable benefits.
President Tinubu has an opportunity to demonstrate the kind of leadership that democratic governance should provide: patient, strategic, focused on long-term interests rather than short-term emotions, and committed to exhausting peaceful options before even considering forceful alternatives. This approach may not satisfy those calling for immediate, dramatic action, but it serves Nigeria’s true interests in a stable, democratic, and integrated West Africa.
The fight, as you correctly noted, is against a system of military governance, not against the people of Burkina Faso or even against Burkina Faso as a nation. Military rule has repeatedly failed Africa, producing neither prosperity, security, nor justice. Democratic governance, for all its challenges and imperfections, remains the best hope for African development and dignity. Nigeria can best advance these principles not through force of arms but through force of example and patient, principled diplomacy.
Let this crisis be resolved through dialogue, understanding, and mutual respect among neighbors. Let Nigeria show West Africa and the world what democratic leadership truly means. And let the safe return of our soldiers demonstrate that diplomacy, backed by strategic patience and regional solidarity, achieves more than military threats ever could.
